

**ACCESS TO CREDIT, FACTOR ALLOCATION AND FARM PRODUCTIVITY:
EVIDENCE FROM THE CEE ECONOMIES**

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Access to Credit, Factor Allocation and Farm Productivity: Evidence From the CEE Economies¹

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This paper analyses how farm access to credit affects farm input allocation and farm efficiency in the CEE countries. Drawing on a unique farm level panel data with 37,409 observations and employing a matching estimator we are able to control for the key source of endogeneity – unobserved heterogeneity. We find that farms are credit constrained both in the short-run as well as in the long-run, but that credit constraint is asymmetric between inputs. Our estimates suggest that farm access to credit increases TFP up to 1.9% per 1000 EUR of additional credit. The use of variable inputs and capital investment increases up to 2.3% and 29%, respectively, per 1000 EUR of additional credit. Due to credit-financed investment in labour-saving farm equipment, labour use reduces for low level of credit. Farms are found not to be credit constrained with respect to land.

Keywords: Access to credit, investment, factor allocation, productivity, transition countries.

JEL classification: Q12, P14.

1. INTRODUCTION

Shortage of credit has long been identified as a crucial factor determining farm development. Budget constraint has been considered to be an important factor limiting farms' use of variable and fixed inputs not only in transition and developing countries but also in developed economies (Bhattacharyya and Kumbhakar 1997; Blancard *et al.*, 2006; Dries and Swinnen 2004; Heltberg 1998; Lee and Chambers, 1986; Färe, Grosskopf and Lee, 1990).

¹ The views expressed are purely those of the authors and may not in any circumstances be regarded as stating an official position of the European Commission.

The availability of credit is determined by many factors, as farms have various options how to access financial resources. In addition, market institutions and/or government interventions influence farms' financing options. First, market integration creates market driven financial structures through which financial resources are channelled to agricultural sector. The recent expansion of vertically integrated markets and contracting were shown to be an important source of credit to farms in CEE (Dries and Swinnen 2004). Second, governments in many countries intervene on input and output markets with agricultural support measures. Even though agricultural support measures may not be intended to directly improve farm access to credit, they may alleviate farms' budget constraint by increasing farms' cash flow and thus increasing their credit-worthiness (Ciaian and Swinnen, 2009). Third, in the presence of costly contract enforcement/asymmetric information, the collateral is more important for granting credit (Bester, 1985; Ghosh, Mookherjee, and Ray, 2000). The importance of collateral for granting credit is in turn conditional on the functioning of rural land markets (Ciaian and Swinnen, 2009). Finally, factors such as rural insurance markets and informal rural institutions directly or indirectly may affect farm credit, for example, by affecting, among others, the risk level of agricultural production, loan guarantee options, and income volatility.

Studies analysing credit markets in developing countries usually focus on the impact of credit on farm productivity, farm inputs and other aspects of rural development (e.g. Bhattacharyya and Kumbhakar 1997; Carter and Olinto 2003; Feder 1985; Heltberg 1998). In contrast, little attention has been paid in transition literature to the relationship between credit constraint and farms' behaviour. Most of the agricultural transition literature analyses factors that determine farm credit in transition countries (Latruffe et al., 2008; Petrick, 2004; Petrick and Latruffe, 2003; Davis et al., 2003; Bezemer, 2002). With few exceptions (e.g. Dries and Swinnen 2004; Gorton and White, 2007; Swinnen, 2007) almost no studies analyse how credit constraint affects farms' input choices and productivity in the CEE transition countries.

The relative scarcity of studies on the relationship between credit constraint and farms' behaviour can be explained by lacking the necessary micro-data for addressing the

identification and endogeneity issues properly. The complexity of imperfect rural credit markets with significant transaction costs makes it extremely difficult to directly test whether, to identify which farms are credit constrained, and to analyse how credit constraint affects farm behaviour, e.g., input allocation and farm productivity in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). If farm access to credit is limited, farms' input choices, farm productivity, and input use are constrained. In addition, the interaction of rural financial structures and government interventions may lead to input specific adjustments. For example, production and input subsidies affect short-run credit which is needed to finance variable inputs rather than long-run credit constraint for fixed inputs (Ciaian and Swinnen, 2009). Underdeveloped land markets limit the possibility to use land as collateral, which reduces farm access to credit particularly affecting the long-run possibilities to finance fixed input purchases. On the other hand, contracting between farms and processors alleviate both short-run credit (e.g. processors may pre-finance fertilizers and seeds) and long-run credit (e.g. processors may pre-finance adaptation of farm technology) (Latruffe et al., 2008; Petrick, 2004; Petrick and Latruffe, 2003; Davis et al., 2003; Bezemer, 2002).

We are able to address the identification and endogeneity issues, by drawing on a unique farm-level panel data with 37,409 observations and employing a non-parametric estimator a la Rosenbaum and Rubin(1983). More precisely, we employ a propensity score matching estimator to measure the impact of credit constraint by looking at farm's performance.

Our paper makes two contributions to the literature. First, we develop a theoretical model which highlights farms' behaviour under credit constraint. The theoretical framework offers testable hypotheses for farm adjustments in input use and output supply. First, with perfect credit markets the source of financing is irrelevant, hence farm access to credit will not affect farm input choices and farm output (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). Second, if farms face symmetric credit constraint on all (variable and fixed) inputs (e.g. long-run farm credit constraint), improved access to credit increases the use of all inputs in the same way (Blancard *et al.*, 2006). A symmetric credit constraint will likely distort the scale of input use, but not the relative input intensities, because it does not affect the

relative (shadow) prices of inputs. Third, asymmetric credit constraint (e.g. short-run farm credit constraint) affects both the relative (shadow) prices of inputs as well as the scale of input use (Lee and Chambers, 1986; Färe, Grosskopf and Lee, 1990). As a result, it will affect both the level of input use and the relative factor intensities. More credit constrained inputs will be substituted for less credit constrained inputs.

Second, the paper contributes to empirical understanding of how farm inputs (land, variable inputs, labour, and capital) and farm output react to changes in farm access to credit in the CEE transition countries. The main complication in analysing the impact of credit constraint on farm behaviour is unobserved heterogeneity, i.e. farms that have access to credit might be systematically different from those that do not. In order to address this issue, we apply a semi-parametric propensity score matching (PSM) estimator. PSM allows to compare farms which differ in the level of credit but which are otherwise similar. Moreover, it allows for testing the impact of access to credit for different farm inputs as well as farm productivity. A differentiated input and productivity response of farms with different access to credit would indicate the impact of farm credit constraint.

Our results have important policy implications, as in the CEE transition countries farms receive a substantial amount of support from the EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). First, farms are granted direct payments either per hectare or coupled to production. Second, farms receive investment support from the EU Rural Development Policies. Our study examines which farm inputs are particularly credit constrained, and hence indicates what kind of support measures might be particularly efficient for policy interventions for alleviating farm credit problems in the CEE transition economies.

The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we introduce the theoretical framework, which allows us to study the impacts of short- and long-run credit constraint. Section 3 outlines the empirical analysis. In section 4 we present the estimation results. Finally, section 5 summarises and concludes.

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Related literature

Several models have been developed for studying farm credit constraint. Lee and Chambers (1986) developed a theoretical framework for modelling farm profit maximisation when farms face constraints on funding short-run farm operating expenses. They consider a situation where farm's total expenditures on variable inputs are constrained by a predetermined level of expenditure. Testing the model on the US data, Lee and Chambers reject unconstrained farm profit maximisation behaviour, while expenditure-constrained profit maximisation could not be rejected.

Färe, Grosskopf, and Lee (1990) adopted a nonparametric alternative to the Lee and Chambers (1986) model. Similar to Lee and Chambers, farm behaviour with constrained expenditure on variable inputs was compared with farm behaviour with no credit constraint. Specifically, a deterministic frontier profit function was constructed with and without expenditure constraints using a linear programming approach. They applied the model to a sample of California rice farms. Their results indicate that 21% of farms faced binding credit constraint. The average profit loss of the expenditure-constrained farms was found to be around 8% of their unconstrained profit.

Blancard et. al (2006) extended the model of Lee and Chambers (1986) and Färe, Grosskopf, and Lee (1990) to differentiate credit constraints between short- and long-run. In the short-run expenditure on variable input was assumed to be constrained, while in the long-run expenditures on all (variable and fixed) inputs were assumed to be constrained. They applied the model on a panel of French farmers in the Nord-Pas-de-Calais region. In the short-run 67% of farms were found to be credit constrained, while in long-run almost all farms were credit constrained. The losses in profits due to credit constraint accounted on average 8% and 49% of profits in short- and long-run, respectively.

Other studies have employed similar approaches to investigate, among others, the productivity effect of farm credit constraint (Bhattacharyya and Kumbhakar, 1997; Briggeman, Towe and Morehart, 2008), productivity and farm size in developing countries (Feder 1985; Carter and Wiebe, 1990), farm input allocation (Bhattacharyya,

Bhattacharyya and Kumbhakar, 1996) and income effects of agricultural support in the presence of credit constraint (Ciaian and Swinnen, 2009).

2.2 The model

We build the theoretical framework of the present study on the model of Blancard et. al (2006). Following Blancard et. al, we consider a representative profit-maximising farm with short- and long-run credit constraint. The constant return to scale production technology ($f(X,Y)$) of the representative farm is assumed to be a function of variable inputs (X) (e.g. variable capital, labour) and fixed inputs (Y) (e.g. fixed capital, land). The representative farm's profits are given by $\Pi = pf(X,Y) - w_X X - w_Y Y$ where p is output price and w_i are input prices for $i = X, Y$.

Farms can be credit constrained in short-run, long-run, or both. The short-run credit constraint arises due to a time lag between agricultural production and payment for variable inputs throughout the season. In general, variable inputs are paid at the beginning of season whereas the revenue from the sale of production is collected after harvest at the end of the season (Feder, 1985; Carter and Wiebe, 1990; Ciaian and Swinnen, 2009). The long-run credit constraint arises due to the mismatch in timing of cash flow from fixed capital and payment for purchase of fixed capital. The cash flow from fixed capital is realised over several years while the cost of purchasing fixed inputs is incurred in the first year of fixed input use in production. These characteristics of agricultural production require pre-financing of inputs. For simplicity, we assume that all credit is provided to the farm by financial institution, which we refer to as "the bank".²

Following Blancard et. al (2006), we model imperfect credit market by assuming that the credit constrained farm has C amount of credit available for financing input purchases. The value of credit C is predetermined level of expenditure which cannot be exceed when purchasing variable and/or fixed inputs:³

² This assumption is not strictly needed to obtain the results.

³ The level of farm credit depends on farm characteristics (e.g. reputation, owned assets, profitability). In general, the evidence from the literature shows that these factors are important determinants of farm credit (e.g. Benjamin and Phimister, 2002; Petrick and Latruffe, 2003; Latruffe, 2005; Briggeman, Towe and

$$(1) \quad w_X X + \delta w_Y Y \leq C$$

where δ is a dummy variable which distinguishes farm credit constraint between short- and long-run. If farm is credit constrained in the long-run, $\delta = 1$, farm faces constrained access to credit for both variable and fixed inputs. If farm is credit constrained in the short-run on expenditure for variable inputs, $\delta = 0$.

Farm maximises profits subject to credit constraint (1) according to the following LaGrangean:

$$(2) \quad \Psi = pf(X, Y) - w_X X - w_Y Y - \lambda(w_X X + \delta w_Y Y - C)$$

where λ is the shadow price of credit constraint. The optimal conditions of a credit constrained farm are as follows:

$$(3) \quad pf_X = (1 + \lambda)w_X$$

$$(4) \quad pf_Y = (1 + \lambda\delta)w_Y$$

From equations (3) and (4) it follows that the marginal value product of variable and fixed inputs is higher than the price of inputs, if farm is credit constrained in the long-run (i.e. if $\delta = 1$ and $\lambda > 0$): $pf_X > w_X$ and $pf_Y > w_Y$, respectively. By increasing input use, the farm could increase its profits, but it cannot use more inputs because of the binding credit constraint. If farm is credit constrained in the short-run (i.e. if $\delta = 0$ and $\lambda > 0$), then only the marginal value product of variable inputs exceeds its price, while the marginal cost of fixed inputs is equal to its own price: $pf_X > w_X$ and $pf_Y = w_Y$, respectively. Finally if farm's credit constraint (1) is not binding (i.e. if $\lambda = 0$), then the marginal value product of inputs is equal to their prices: $pf_X = w_X$ and $pf_Y = w_Y$.

2.3 The impact of credit constraint on production

Morehart; 2008). For example, Latruffe (2005) finds in the case of Poland that farmers with more tangible assets and with more owned land were less credit constrained than others. Briggeman Towe and Morehart (2008) find for farm and non-farm sole proprietorships in US that the probability of being denied credit is reduced, among others, by net worth, income, price of assets, and subsidies.

To establish a point of comparison, we first identify the equilibrium without credit constraint ($\lambda = 0$). This is illustrated in Figure 1. The vertical axis shows quantity of fixed input (Y), the horizontal axis shows quantity of variable input (X). The equilibrium farm use of variable and fixed inputs with non-binding credit constraint is determined at the point, where the relative marginal value products of inputs is equal to their relative market prices: $pf_X / pf_Y \Big|_* = w_X / w_Y \Big|_*$.⁴ We assume that this is at point D in Figure 1. The equilibrium D is determined by the tangent between isoquant I and the isocost curve EE . We assume that the output level given by the isoquant I represents the optimal farm size in the agricultural economy for the given input and output prices and with non-binding credit constraint. The source of financing with no credit constraint is irrelevant; the credit does not affect output level and farm input choices.

Short-run credit constraint

The impact of the short-run credit constraint can be decomposed in two effects: input substitution effect and scale effect. The short-run credit constraint affects farm inputs asymmetrically: farm is credit constrained with respect to variable input while unconstrained with respect to fixed input (i.e. $\delta = 0$). The short-run credit constraint increases the shadow price of the variable input above its market price ($pf_X = (1 + \lambda)w_X \Big|_S > pf_X = w_X \Big|_*$, see equations (3) and (4)). Variable input becomes relatively more expensive in terms of the fixed input $(1 + \lambda)w_X / w_Y \Big|_S > w_X / w_Y \Big|_*$. As a result, farm substitutes credit constrained variable inputs for credit un-constrained fixed inputs along the isoquant I . In Figure 1 the isocost curve rotates from EE (determined by relative input prices $w_X / w_Y \Big|_*$) to $E_S'E_S'$ (determined by relative input prices $(1 + \lambda)w_X / w_Y \Big|_S$) Figure 1. This shifts the equilibrium from point D to point F . The substitution effect changes the relative quantity of inputs for a given level of output ($X'_S < X^*_S$ and $Y'_S > Y^*_S$).

⁴ We define the notations $x \Big|_*$, $x \Big|_S$ and $x \Big|_L$ for equilibriums with non-binding credit constraint, short-run credit constraint and long-run credit constraint, respectively.

Second, because farms are credit constrained to finance the variable inputs, the isocost curve shifts from $E_s'E_s'$ to EE_s . The isocost curve EE_s is kinked because binding credit constraint fixes the variable input at X_S^C .⁵ Farms cannot use more variable inputs than X_S^C . This scale effect of short-run credit constraint shifts the equilibrium from F to B along the isoquant I_S . The equilibrium B corresponds to a parallel shift of the isocost curve from $E_s'E_s'$ to $E_s''E_s''$ by keeping the relative input prices unchanged at $(1 + \lambda)w_X/w_Y|_S$. Totally differentiating the FOCs (3) and (4) and the credit constraint (1) and solving for the impact of credit constraint on variable input, fixed input and output ($dX/dC|_S$, $dY/dC|_S$ and $df/dC|_S$) implies that $dX/dC|_S = pf_{YY}/w_X pf_{YY} > 0$, $dY/dC|_S = -pf_{YX}/w_X pf_{YY} > 0$ and $df/dC|_S = (-f_Y pf_{YX} + f_X pf_{YY})/w_X pf_{YY} > 0$, respectively.⁶ This implies that the short-run credit constraint through this scale effect reduces the equilibrium output and inputs. The isoquant I_S is below the isoquant I implying lower output with a binding the short-run credit constraint than the output without credit constraint. The lower output scale reduces the use of both inputs ($X_S^C < X_S'$ and $Y_S^* < Y_S'$).

Summing up the two effects (i.e. the substitution effect and the scale effect), the short-run credit constraint reduces the equilibrium output, decreases the equilibrium credit constrained variable input use ($X_S^* < X^*$), and may increase or decrease the credit unconstrained fixed input ($Y_S^* \lessgtr Y^*$). The fixed input use increases with credit constraint, if the substitution effect is stronger than the scale effect. Otherwise, i.e. if the substitution effect is smaller than the scale effect, the fixed input use decreases.

Long-run credit constraint

⁵ From equation (1) it follows that with binding short-run credit constraint $X_S^C|_S = C/w_X$.

⁶ f_i and f_{ii} are first and second derivatives of the production function with respect to its arguments, respectively. Note that with constant return to scale production function $pf_i > 0$, $pf_{ii} < 0$ and $pf_{ij} > 0$.

With long-run credit constraint ($\delta = 1$) farm's finances are symmetrically limited for both inputs. Totally differentiating the FOCs (3) and (4) and the credit constraint (1) and solving for $dX/dC|_L$, $dY/dC|_L$ and $df/dC|_L$ yields:

$$(5) \quad \frac{dX}{dC}\Big|_L = \frac{\frac{1}{w_X} \left(pf_{YY} - pf_{XY} \frac{\delta w_Y}{w_X} \right)}{pf_{YY} + \left(pf_{XX} \frac{\delta w_Y}{w_X} - pf_{YX} - pf_{XY} \right) \frac{\delta w_Y}{w_X}} > 0$$

$$(6) \quad \frac{dY}{dC}\Big|_L = \frac{\frac{1}{w_X} \left[pf_{XX} \frac{\delta w_Y}{w_X} - pf_{YX} \right]}{pf_{YY} + \left(pf_{XX} \frac{\delta w_Y}{w_X} - pf_{YX} - pf_{XY} \right) \frac{\delta w_Y}{w_X}} > 0$$

$$(7) \quad \frac{df}{dC}\Big|_L = \frac{f_Y \left[pf_{XX} \frac{\delta w_Y}{w_X} - pf_{YX} \right] + f_X \left[pf_{YY} - pf_{XY} \frac{\delta w_Y}{w_X} \right]}{w_X \left[pf_{YY} + \left(pf_{XX} \frac{\delta w_Y}{w_X} - pf_{YX} - pf_{XY} \right) \frac{\delta w_Y}{w_X} \right]} > 0$$

The long-run credit constraint reduces both farm inputs and output.⁷ In Figure 1 the long-run credit constraint shifts the isocost curve from EE to $E_L E_L$. The new equilibrium is at the tangency point between the isocost curve $E_L E_L$ and the isoquant I_L given by point A . The long-run credit constraint does not affect the relative input prices: $(1 + \lambda)w_X / [(1 + \lambda)w_Y]_L = w_X / w_Y|_L = w_X / w_Y|_*$.⁸ As a result, the substitution between inputs will not occur. Only the scale effect will reduce the output and input use. Compared to the case with no credit constraint (point D), farms use less of both inputs ($X_L^* < X^*$, $Y_L^* < Y^*$) and produce less output (given by the new isoquant curve I_L).

⁷ Note that the necessary condition for a maximum for the farm profit function is that its second derivative must be negative ($\frac{\partial^2 \Pi}{\partial Y^2} < 0$): $\frac{\partial^2 \Pi}{\partial Y^2} = pf_{YY} + \left(pf_{XX} \frac{\delta w_Y}{w_X} - pf_{YX} - pf_{XY} \right) \frac{\delta w_Y}{w_X} < 0$.

⁸ In Figure 1 this implies that the initial isocost curve EE is parallel with the isocost curve $E_L E_L$.

The theoretical results of our model can be summarised into four hypotheses: (i) input allocation and output scale is not affected by credit if farms are not credit constrained; (ii) with asymmetric short-run credit constraint the alleviation of farm credit constraint increases the equilibrium output and the equilibrium use of the credit constrained variable inputs; (iii) the use of credit un-constrained fixed inputs decreases, if the substitution effect is stronger than the scale effect, while it increases otherwise; (iv) if a symmetric long-run credit constraint is relaxed, the scale of production and the use of both inputs increases.

3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

3.1 Econometric specification

Empirical testing of the derived theoretical hypothesis faces several complications. One of the key econometric problems when estimating the effect of credit is potential selection bias, which stems from the fact that assignment to treatment (access to credit) is non-random and depends on farm characteristics. Several approaches are proposed in the literature to overcome this difficulty. Heckman model provides one solution (Petrick, 2004). Other approaches include the use of switching regressors (Feder et al., 1990; Carter and Olinto, 2003).

In this paper we employ a matching estimator (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983), which serves as a nonparametric alternative to linear regressions. The employed matching approach has two main advantages over the standard approaches. First, it does not impose any functional-form assumption on how the access to credit affects farm's behaviour. Accordingly, we can allow for all types of heterogeneities and non-linearities in the effect of credit. Second, it allows us to base our analysis only on comparisons between farms similar in terms of observable characteristics. By doing so we avoid the potential problem of drawing inferences from comparisons made between very different farms, which are likely to bias linear regression results (see, e.g. Blundell and Costa Dias, 2009).

Despite these advantages, due to high data demand, matching methods have been only scarcely used in agricultural economics (few examples include Dabalén et al. 2004;

Bento et al., 2007; Key and Roberts, 2008; Pufahl and Weiss, 2009). The popularity of matching methods in investigating the impact of credit on farm performance is even lower (to our knowledge the only exemption is Briggeman et al., 2008).

The large size of our farm level data allows us to employ the matching approach for studying the determinants and implications of rural credit constraints. We employ the propensity score matching estimator proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and further developed, among others, by Heckman et al. (1997, 1998), to study the impact of farm access to credit on farm performance measured by its output, productivity, investment behaviour, labour, land use, and variable costs.

Using the same notation as in the theoretical model, C denotes an indicator for farm having access to credit ($C=1$) or having no credit ($C=0$). Let Y_{1i} be the potential performance of a farm i with access to credit (i.e. exposed to the treatment) and Y_{0i} the potential performance of a farm i without access to credit (i.e. not exposed to the treatment, control). Finally denote X a vector of observable covariates. Then the expected casual effect of the treatment on farm i 's performance, and our outcome of interest, would be $E(Y_{1i} - Y_{0i} | X_i, C_i=1)$.

Given that we do not observe what would have happened if the farm with credit had been denied access to external funding (or vice versa), we construct an estimate of the counterfactual: $E(Y_{0i} | X_i, C_i=1)$. As showed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), comparing farms with similar probability of getting credit given the observables in X is equivalent to comparing farms with similar values of X . Accordingly, using a logit model a probability for each farm of getting credit (propensity score) is computed. Next, based on this propensity score, for each treated observation a counterfactual is estimated using the kernel matching procedure.⁹ This allows us to compare each treated observation only with controls having similar values of X . To assure that the compared farms are not too different in terms of propensity score, we employ matching with caliper (0.01).

⁹ 1 to 1 matching method was also used. However the results remained unaffected and therefore, they are not reported here.

It is important to note that the adopted matching procedure relies on two critical assumptions: first, the so called *selection on observables* assumption and second, the *common support* assumption. The former assumes that propensity score is a balancing function, i.e. conditional on X , without access to credit the treated farms would behave in the same way as the control farms.¹⁰ The latter assumes that propensity score is bounded between 0 and 1, i.e. the treatment is not predicted too well.

3.2 Empirical implementation

The econometric analysis outlined in section 3.1 requires data on farm credit and outcome variables determining farm access to credit. The main data source is the Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) (see Appendix).

The *dependent variable* in the probit model – farm credit - is constructed from the FADN total liabilities (SE485), which we normalise by farm output (SE131). Farm output, as all other financial variables, is measured in Euro.

Also the *outcome variables* are constructed from the FADN data. In total we use six output variables to measure farm's behaviour. Farm output is directly available in the FADN data (SE131). The same applies to the investment variable which captures gross investment on fixed assets (SE516). Variable costs are calculated by summing up the total specific costs (SE281), total farming overheads (SE336), and wages paid (SE370). Labour and land use are directly available in the FADN data (SE010 and SE025, respectively). We normalise all cost variables – the gross investment, variable costs, land and labour – by output. Finally, based on the FADN, we use the Total Factor Productivity estimates based on Olley and Pakes (1996) estimator as the sixth output variable.

The *explanatory variables* for the first stage probit model are chosen such that the propensity score is a balancing function and are based on the theoretical framework outlined in section 2 and following the literature, while considering our data constraints.

¹⁰ As noted by Heckman *et al.* (1997), treated and controls may still differ even after conditioning on observables. This may be due to unobservable characteristics. One possible solution to mitigate this problem is to combine matching procedure with difference-in-differences method (see for instance, Pufahl and Weiss, 2009). However, given that our data spans only two years and does not include information on timing of granting credit, this method cannot be applied in our study.

To capture differences in farms' liquidity, we include *subsidies* that farms may get on number of accounts. The subsidy variable is directly available in the FADN data (SE605). Following the literature, we normalise the subsidy variable by output.

There is a large variation in our sample in the use of own land and labour between farms. Some farms rent large share of the utilised land whereas others utilise only the owned land. Similarly, some farms use mainly hired labour, whereas others rely only on family workforce. To control for this source of heterogeneity, in the logit regression we include two factor ownership variables: *share of land owned* and *share of hired labour*. The former measures the ratio of owned land in total land endowment. The latter, on the other hand, represents the share of hired labour in the total farm labour.

Further, since farm access to credit often depends on farms' ability to provide collateral, we condition farm credit on the *total fixed owned assets*. This variable is constructed by subtracting long and medium-term loans (SE490) from the total fixed assets (SE441). As above, we normalise the total own fixed assets by output.

According to Briggeman, Towe and Morehart (2008), it is reasonable to assume that farm access to credit and farms' investment decisions and/or other input use may be determined by its size and general economic performance. In order to control for this source of heterogeneity, we also include a covariate *economic size*, which represents farm economic size measured in European Size Units (ESU) (SE005).

Finally, in addition to the described explanatory variables, in the first stage regressions we also include *dummy variables* to control for time dimension, sector and geographical location. All dummy variables are directly available from the FADN data: time dummy (year), sector (A8) and region dummy (A2).¹¹

According to Briggeman, Towe and Morehart (2008), the impact of credit constraint is non-linear in the degree of credit constraint. In order to control for this, we split the

¹¹ In addition, we experiment also with lagged debt asset ratio as an explanatory variable. Although it improved the prediction power of our first-stage probit models it did not affect the results of our second stage treatment effect estimations. Moreover, it limited our sample only to farms with observations for two points in time which had detrimental effect on balancing properties of our matching procedure. Therefore, for brevity reasons we do not report these results here.

whole sample into 8 credit groups.¹² Group 1 contains farms with zero credit.¹³ Group 2 contains farms with small credits, up to 10% of output (Table 1). Groups from 3 to 7 contain farms with gradually increasing credit-output ratio ranging from 11% to 100% of output. Finally, group 8 represents farms with the largest liabilities (over 100% of the output). In total our dataset contains 37,409 farms.¹⁴

TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

In order to better understand the impact of credit on farm's performance, we employ the matching estimator not only to investigate the impact of having access to credit in general but also to study the differences between farms with different credit levels. In the latter case the treatment is defined as having relatively better access to credit. Accordingly, matching is done to obtain the following comparisons: group 2 vs group 1, group 3 vs group 2, group 4 vs group 3, group 5 vs group 4, group 6 vs group 5, group 7 vs group 6, and group 8 vs group 7.

Findings of Bezemer (2002); Petrick and Latruffe (2003); and Davis et al., (2003) suggest that the effects of credit are heterogeneous across countries and that, for example, countries with higher land fragmentation are particularly prone to suffer from the credit constraint problem. Therefore, in addition to working with pooled data (8 countries), we also examine each country separately (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland).¹⁵

4. ESTIMATION RESULTS

Matching

Three key points about matching are worth to note.¹⁶ First, before imposing the common support assumption, in each country the treated and control farms differ significantly with

¹² The division of farms into these 8 groups was done so to satisfy the condition that number of treated observations should be smaller than number of controls.

¹³ Important to note is the fact that this does not mean that farms in this group were denied credit.

¹⁴ At the end, after cleaning the data from outliers, our analysis was based on 34,169 observations.

¹⁵ Slovenia and Slovakia were dropped due to insufficient number of observations for given size classes.

¹⁶ Due to large number of comparisons made, results of tests showing how well did the propensity score as a balancing function are not reported here. However, they might be obtained from authors upon request.

regard to almost all covariates selected for the analysis. This, in turn, suggests that matching of farms is required for meaningful comparisons.

Second, matching reduces these differences in a substantial majority of cases analysed. However, in some cases not all differences between the treated and controls were removed, implying that some of the covariates retained very different distribution in both groups. On the pooled sample the propensity score succeeded in balancing the distribution of relevant covariates across treated and control farms in six out of seven cases. For country sub-samples balancing properties were fulfilled in 3 out of 7 cases for Latvia, 5 out of 7 cases for Czech Republic, Estonia and Lithuania and 6 out of 7 cases for Poland. We conclude therefore, that although the propensity score does not find perfectly comparable observations, it helps to identify control group which is much more similar to the treated one than in the full sample.

Third, for the vast majority of logit regressions the pseudo R^2 is relatively low (ranging from 0.08 to 0.15),¹⁷ suggesting that the covariates used leave a lot of residual variation unexplained. One may argue, therefore, that the included covariates do not accurately predict the state of being granted a (higher) credit. This is presumably due to the fact that our dataset although extensive in farm dimensions is rather limited in some others, as it does not contain any individual characteristics of a farmer (e.g. age, education, having a successor etc.), which are likely to be of importance when the decision on the total credit level is made. However, the objective of this study is not to specify a statistical model explaining farm access to credit in the best possible way. Having logit regressions with large prediction power would lead to a much smaller number of treated farms meeting the common support assumption. This is especially important for country sub-samples, where the number of observations in per credit size group is relatively small (sometimes around 200). Moreover, also other empirical studies employing matching estimators for studying farm access to credit report low pseudo R^2 (e.g. Briggeman, Towe and Morehart (2008) report pseudo R^2 0.31).

¹⁷ This concerned especially regressions predicting transitions between groups of farms with credit-output ratio larger than zero. Somewhat better predictions were obtained for transitions between credit groups 2 and 1, i.e. between having no credit at all and having credit not exceeding 10% of the production value (pseudo R^2 ranging from 0.1 to 0.3 depending on (sub-)sample used).

Bearing these limitations in mind, we conclude that the balancing property of our matching is both statistically and economically satisfied and it is justifiable to estimate the treatment effect of farm access to credit according to the econometric strategy outlined above.

Pooled sample

Tables 2 and 3 display the results for the pooled sample in absolute values and in percentages, respectively. Each column refers to different output variables. All estimators are based on Kernel matching and the reported numbers should read: positive (negative) number refers to increase (decrease) in output variable for farms in the treated group compared to farms in the control group¹⁸. For example, the results for investments shown in column 3 of Table 3 (Table 2) indicate that farms in credit class 2 have 29.04% more investments per 1000 EUR of additional credit than farms in credit class 1 (by 0.086 investments per output).

TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE

Based on these results several conclusions could be drawn. First, no statistically significant impact of credit on the value of production was found (column 1). Although the results suggest that access to (higher) credit positively affects the value of production in all except the two highest credit-per-output groups, the precision of the obtained estimates is too low to render them significantly different from zero.¹⁹ Second, the obtained results suggest that access to (higher) credit has a positive impact on the total factor productivity. The increase in the TFP between credit classes ranges between 0.07% and 1.87% per 1000 EUR of additional credit with the largest gain in productivity being for low level of credit (Table 3). This indicates a decrease in the marginal productivity per additional credit. This result is consistent with the estimates reported in column 3 suggesting that access to credit increases the level of relative investments. Investment is significant for most credit group comparisons. Investment increases between 0.14% and

¹⁸ To facilitate the reading of the Table, the treated group is indicated in bold.

¹⁹ However, given that semi-parametric methods trade off reduced bias due to specification error against less efficiency, this result is not that surprising.

29.04% per 1000 EUR of additional credit (Table 3). Interestingly, no impact on the relative land endowments was found (column 4). Furthermore, our results suggest that credit has a positive effect on the use of variable inputs (between 0.01%, and 2.34% per 1000 EUR of additional credit, Table 3). Finally, our results suggest a negative impact on the use of labour (between -0.14%, and -1.64% per 1000 EUR of additional credit, Table 3). This can be explained by the fact that through credit farms mainly finance capital equipment, which usually is labour saving. The negative relationship between farm access to credit and labour use is reverse for the two highest credit/output ratio groups (by 0.02% per 1000 EUR of additional credit, Table 3). This indicates that labour is being substituted by capital up to a point, where more investment ultimately reduces such possibility.

Overall, these results suggest that farms are credit constrained both in the short-run as well as in the long-run. Further, our results indicate that farms are asymmetrically credit constrained. Farms tend to be credit constrained with respect to investments and variable inputs, but credit unconstrained with respect to land and labour. For labour the results indicate that substitution effect tends to be stronger than the scale effect (particularly for low credit classes) leading to substitution of labour for credit constrained investments and variable inputs. For land the substitution effect tends to offset the scale effect leading to no impact of credit on land.

Country level analysis

In order to gain more country-specific insights, we examine how these patterns differ across the CEE transition countries. The obtained estimates of treatment effects based on country sub-samples are presented in Tables 4-9.

TABLES 4-9 ABOUT HERE

These results essentially complement our previous findings based on the pooled sample. First, we observe robust evidence on the positive and significant impact of access to credit on investment. Second, no single evidence was found that the credit constraint would influence farm's land use. This result again suggests that farms in CEE are not

credit constrained with respect to land. Third, except for the two groups with the highest credit-output ratio, farm access to credit has negative impact on labour use. As noted above, this can be explained by the fact that through credit farms mainly finance credit constrained capital equipment, which usually is labour saving. Fourth, an interesting pattern emerges with respect to farm productivity. The obtained estimates suggest a statistically significant increase in TFP in three our sample countries: Hungary, Lithuania and Poland. These results are interesting, because these three countries are those with the highest share of small individual farms. This, in turn, indicates that credit constraint might be more problematic for small individual farms compared to large corporate farms. Moreover, in these three countries a significantly positive impact of farm access to credit could be observed on output. However, the effect is distinguishable from zero only for farms with the smallest credit-output ratio. Fifth, at country level the pattern of credit's impact on variable inputs is much less clear than in the pooled sample, which might be due to sizeable cross-country differences in farm structure. On the one hand, for all countries having relatively small credit significantly increases the use of variable inputs. On the other hand, for other credit size groups the estimates are much less stable and statistically insignificant from zero.

In summary, the country level estimates are largely consistent with the pooled sample results. Farms tend to be credit constrained both in the short-run as well as in the long-run, but different inputs are asymmetrically credit constrained. The statistical significance level is smaller for the country level results than for pooled sample. However, this is expected, as the sample size is considerably smaller.

5. CONCLUSIONS

The present paper studies the impact of credit constraint on farm behaviour in the CEE transition countries. The theoretical model suggests that, in the presence of credit constraint, improved access to credit may lead to productivity increase, scale adjustments of inputs as well as induce substitution between inputs. With symmetric long-run credit constraint, the alleviation of farm credit constraint increases the use of all inputs. However, if farms are asymmetrically short-run credit constrained, then improved access

to credit may lead to substitution of credit-constrained inputs to credit-unconstrained inputs.

The empirical results for CEE suggest that farms are credit constrained both in the short-run and in the long-run. Access to credit increases TFP up to 1.9% per 1000 EUR of additional credit. However, our estimates indicate that farms are asymmetrically credit constrained. Farms tend to face acute problems in financing variable inputs and capital investments, as variable inputs and capital investments increase up to 2.3% and 29%, respectively, per 1000 EUR of additional credit. On the other hand, land and labour are not credit constrained. This could be due to the relatively high land abundance and high agricultural labour employment in the CEE transition countries, particularly in Poland, Slovenia and the Baltic states. An alternative explanation could be that farms are able to better cope with financing issues of land and labour compared to variable inputs and investments. Family farms use mainly own labour in production, which reduces the need for pre-financing. Family labour can address credit problem by postponing household consumption to a latter period, when the revenue from the production sales is collected (after the harvest at the end of the season). Similar holds for land. Farms can address the access to land through rental markets. Rental markets are relatively important in transition countries with more than 50% of land being rented (Ciaian and Kancs, 2009). Additionally, in most cases rents are paid at the end of the season, which further reduces the pre-financing needs for land (Ciaian and Kancs, 2009). Furthermore, (own) land serves as good collateral and therefore, this is an additional factor which may reduce farms' credit constraint on land.

An important factor, which may reduce farm capital constraint for variable inputs and investments, are CAP subsidies as well as vertical contracting with processors and/or traders. Even though both CAP subsidies and contracting have increased in recent years, our results indicate that they were unable to fully eliminate farm credit problems in the CEE transition economies.

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Table 1. Definition and summary of credit groups

Credit group	Credit / output, %	No observations
1	0	10832
2	0-10	4406
3	10-20	4147
4	20-30	3976
5	30-45	3853
6	45-70	3687
7	70-100	3377
8	>100	3131

Note: Group 1 captures farms with zero credit, group 8 represents farms with the largest credit/output ratio.
Source: Authors' calculations based on the FADN data.

Table 2. Credit and farm behaviour: Matching estimates of the effect of accessing credit on farm output and inputs – pooled sample

Credit classes: treated vs. control	Output (EUR) (1)	TFP (index) (2)	Investments (EUR per output) (3)	Land (Ha per output) (4)	Variable inputs (EUR per output) (5)	Labour (persons per output) (6)
2 vs. 1	5186	0.057 ***	0.086 ***	0.005	0.116 ***	-0.031 ***
<i>t-stat</i>	1.18	9.30	26.97	0.59	24.36	-5.97
3 vs. 2	5613	0.027 ***	0.006	-0.006	0.011 **	-0.006 *
<i>t-stat</i>	1.06	5.41	1.40	-0.76	2.48	-1.82
4 vs. 3	7131	0.035 ***	0.024 ***	-0.004	0.0005	-0.016 ***
<i>t-stat</i>	1.15	6.55	4.98	-0.61	0.13	-4.91
5 vs. 4	8586	0.031 ***	0.028 ***	-0.005	0.003	-0.010 ***
<i>t-stat</i>	1.12	5.23	4.91	-0.72	0.68	-3.31
6 vs. 5	3746	0.022 ***	0.059 ***	-0.007	0.005	-0.002
<i>t-stat</i>	0.40	3.44	8.70	-0.87	1.13	-0.80
7 vs. 6	-2864	0.009	0.059 ***	-0.002	0.010 *	0.001
<i>t-stat</i>	-0.29	1.31	6.75	-0.27	1.84	0.37
8 vs. 7	-7179	-0.014	0.128 ***	0.0009	0.016 **	0.009 **
<i>t-stat</i>	-0.73	-1.53	9.56	0.09	2.53	2.30

Source: Authors' own calculations. ***, **, * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively

Table 3. Percentage change of productivity and use of inputs per 1000 EUR of additional credit – Pooled sample (%/EUR credit)

	Output (1)	TFP (2)	Investment (3)	Land (4)	Variable inputs (5)	Labour (6)
2 vs 1	1.87	1.87***	29.04***	0.12	2.34***	-1.64***
3 vs 2	0.36	0.31***	0.56	-0.05	0.05**	-0.20*
4 vs 3	0.03	0.25***	0.62***	0.00	0.00	-0.31***
5 vs 4	0.00	0.14***	0.41***	0.00	0.00	-0.14***
6 vs 5	0.0	0.07***	0.44***	-0.01	0.00	-0.01
7 vs 6	-0.03	0.02	0.21***	0.00	0.01*	0.02
8 vs 7	-0.03	0.00	0.14***	0.00	0.01**	0.02**

Source: Authors' own calculations. ***, **, * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively

Table 4. Credit and farm behaviour: CZECH REPUBLIC

	Output	TFP	Investments	Land	Variable inputs	Labour
2 vs 1	7164	0.020	0.066 ***	-0.040	0.155 ***	-0.011
<i>t-stat</i>	0.65	0.68	8.69	-0.79	5.56	-1.03
3 vs 2	22660	-0.0001	0.030 *	-0.009	0.018	-0.011 **
<i>t-stat</i>	0.89	-0.01	1.80	-0.30	0.95	-2.53
4 vs 3	13932	0.003	0.003	-0.020	-0.0004	-0.004
<i>t-stat</i>	0.20	0.12	0.13	-0.49	-0.01	-0.80
5 vs 4	60068	0.023	0.029	.0144	0.005	-0.004
<i>t-stat</i>	0.77	1.02	1.58	-0.50	0.22	-1.11
6 vs 5	-33244	0.002	0.037 **	0.002	0.025	0.005 *
<i>t-stat</i>	-0.44	0.11	1.98	0.13	1.35	1.65
7 vs 6	-20499	0.012	0.031	-0.001	-0.013	-0.003
<i>t-stat</i>	-0.31	0.70	1.30	-0.10	-0.80	-1.30
8 vs 7	-21002	0.023	0.027	-0.006	0.025	0.007 **
<i>t-stat</i>	-0.30	1.10	0.72	-0.29	1.16	2.14

Source: Authors' own calculations. ***, **, * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively

Table 5. Credit and farm behaviour: ESTONIA

	Output	TFP	Investments	Land	Variable inputs	Labour
2 vs 1	1642	0.013	0.074 ***	-0.005	0.153 ***	-0.015
<i>t-stat</i>	0.53	0.30	6.26	-0.10	4.53	-0.51
3 vs 2	-25352	0.005	0.002	0.015	0.017	0.005
<i>t-stat</i>	-1.04	0.14	0.12	0.30	0.57	0.23
4 vs 3	13698	0.022	0.060 **	0.015	-0.004	-0.009
<i>t-stat</i>	0.33	0.52	2.44	0.29	-0.14	-0.41
5 vs 4	10230	0.002	0.047 *	0.002	0.012	-0.004
<i>t-stat</i>	0.26	0.06	1.78	0.05	0.51	-0.35
6 vs 5	5929	0.068 *	0.071 **	0.0005	-0.033	0.009
<i>t-stat</i>	0.19	1.83	2.02	0.01	-1.24	0.68
7 vs 6	-275	-0.002	0.129 ***	-0.016	0.038	0.006
<i>t-stat</i>	-0.01	-0.07	2.69	-0.38	1.45	0.36
8 vs 7	-10496	-0.06	0.206 ***	0.020	0.017	0.015
<i>t-stat</i>	-0.23	-1.18	2.57	0.39	0.48	0.62

Source: Authors' own calculations. ***, **, * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively

Table 6. Credit and farm behaviour: HUNGARY

	Output	TFP	Investments	Land	Variable inputs	Labour
2 vs 1	-104	0.074 ***	0.039	-0.007	0.086 ***	-0.011
<i>t-stat</i>	-0.02	2.57	3.66	-0.15	3.13	-0.63
3 vs 2	20825 **	0.091 ***	0.018	-0.004	-0.031 *	-0.010 *
<i>t-stat</i>	2.36	4.58	1.40	-0.13	-1.83	-1.71
4 vs 3	11824	0.042 **	0.005	-0.002	0.008	0.001
<i>t-stat</i>	0.49	1.97	0.39	-0.08	0.47	0.29
5 vs 4	10825	0.050 **	0.023	0.016	-0.023	-0.008
<i>t-stat</i>	0.38	2.45	1.77	0.52	-1.32	-1.39
6 vs 5	1308	0.0007	0.038	0.01	0.007	0.006
<i>t-stat</i>	0.04	0.04	2.82	0.40	0.52	1.36
7 vs 6	-13498	0.034 *	0.036	0.01	0.0006	-0.002
<i>t-stat</i>	-0.44	1.86	2.09	0.41	0.05	-0.54
8 vs 7	3189	-0.038 **	0.152	0.001	0.029 *	0.004
<i>t-stat</i>	0.12	-1.97	5.80	0.06	1.89	0.83

Source: Authors' own calculations. ***, **, * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively

Table 7. Credit and farm behaviour: LITHUANIA

	Output	TFP	Investments	Land	Variable inputs	Labour
2 vs 1	9777 **	0.066 ***	0.123 ***	0.028	0.106 ***	-0.04 ***
<i>t-stat</i>	2.08	3.41	9.30	0.95	7.40	-3.10
3 vs 2	4611	0.036 *	0.031	0.008	0.0127	0.019 *
<i>t-stat</i>	0.43	1.88	1.49	-0.33	0.84	-1.94
4 vs 3	-5921	0.044 *	-	0.002	-0.001	-0.009
<i>t-stat</i>	-0.36	1.90	-0.19	0.07	-0.08	-1.12
5 vs 4	1046	0.039	0.068 ***	0.001	0.004	-0.0001
<i>t-stat</i>	0.06	1.51	2.65	0.05	0.29	-0.02
6 vs 5	-5003	0.015	0.144 ***	0.0008	0.0127	0.001
<i>t-stat</i>	-0.18	0.55	3.95	0.03	0.68	0.15
7 vs 6	872	-	0.092 **	-0.002	0.022	-0.014 *
<i>t-stat</i>	0.04	-0.41	2.09	-0.09	1.12	-1.79
8 vs 7	-9751	-	0.327 ***	0.0007	0.039	0.023 *
<i>t-stat</i>	-0.56	-1.42	5.00	0.02	1.62	1.66

Source: Authors' own calculations. ***, **, * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively

Table 8. Credit and farm behaviour: LATVIA

	Output	Tfp	Investments	Land	Variable inputs	Labour
2 vs 1	10385 ***	0.017	0.128 ***	0.021	0.141	-0.026
<i>t-stat</i>	3.16	0.46	7.91	0.52	5.45	-0.86
3 vs 2	-12669	0.035	0.052	0.001	-0.012	-0.020
<i>t-stat</i>	-0.48	1.00	1.58	0.03	-0.47	-1.01
4 vs 3	23078	0.028	0.007	0.0009	-0.018	-0.026
<i>t-stat</i>	0.55	0.76	0.18	0.02	-0.70	-1.42
5 vs 4	10145	0.014	0.021	-0.023	-0.003	-0.002
<i>t-stat</i>	0.23	0.45	0.58	-0.54	-0.13	-0.16
6 vs 5	-10943	-0.001	0.080 **	-0.014	0.017	-0.015
<i>t-stat</i>	-0.27	-0.05	2.10	-0.36	0.80	-0.92
7 vs 6	-51271	-0.035	0.151 ***	-0.005	0.004	0.002
<i>t-stat</i>	-1.01	-0.95	3.48	-0.15	0.18	0.18
8 vs 7	19598	0.013	0.271 ***	0.015	0.025	-0.006
<i>t-stat</i>	0.57	0.30	3.95	0.34	0.89	-0.48

Source: Authors' own calculations. ***, **, * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively

Table 9. Credit and farm behaviour: POLAND

	Output	TFP	Investments	Land	Variable inputs	Labour
2 vs 1	9492 ***	0.066 ***	0.066 ***	0.0001	0.097 ***	-0.035 ***
<i>t-stat</i>	5.47	13.55	19.90	0.02	27.56	-8.12
3 vs 2	2419	0.025 ***	-0.001	-0.005	0.014 ***	-0.003
<i>t-stat</i>	1.10	4.52	-0.34	-0.79	3.48	-0.74
4 vs 3	4648 *	0.038 ***	0.024 ***	0.001	-0.001	0.015 ***
<i>t-stat</i>	1.70	6.61	4.35	-0.21	-0.32	-3.70
5 vs 4	-133	0.035 ***	0.024 ***	-0.002	0.0006	-0.009 **
<i>t-stat</i>	-0.04	5.25	3.63	-0.31	0.15	-2.48
6 vs 5	4190	0.033 ***	0.057 ***	-0.002	-0.003	-0.003
<i>t-stat</i>	1.12	4.43	6.73	-0.34	-0.68	-0.85
7 vs 6	-1565	0.015 *	0.055 ***	-0.0005	0.009 *	0.003
<i>t-stat</i>	-0.40	1.75	4.91	-0.06	1.72	0.80
8 vs 7	-5619	-0.001	0.114 ***	0.005	0.007	0.016 ***
<i>t-stat</i>	-1.62	-0.12	6.46	0.50	1.08	2.78

Source: Authors' own calculations. ***, **, * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively

APPENDIX

Data

The main source of data we use in the empirical analysis comes from the Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) compiled and maintained by the European Commission. The FADN is a European system of sample surveys that take place each year and collect structural and accountancy data on the farms. In total there is information about 150 variables on farm structure and yield, output, costs, subsidies and taxes, income, balance sheet, and financial indicators. The yearly FADN sample covers approximately 18,700 agricultural farms in the eight NMS. In 2004 they represented a population of almost 1,000,000 farms in the seven NMS, covering approximately 90% of the total utilised agricultural area and accounting for more than 90% of the total agricultural production. The aggregate FADN data are publicly available. However, farm-level data are confidential and, for the purposes of this study, accessed under a special agreement.

To our knowledge, the FADN is the only source of micro-economic data that is harmonised (the bookkeeping principles are the same across all EU Member States) and is representative of the commercial agricultural holdings in the EU. Holdings are selected to take part in the survey on the basis of sampling plans established at the level of each region in the EU. The survey does not, however, cover all the agricultural holdings in the Union (universe defined by Community surveys on the structure of agricultural holdings), but only those which are of a size allowing them to rank as commercial holdings.

In the present study we use a sub-sample, which covers the eight NMS from the CEE. From the FADN data for two years (2004 and 2005) we create a panel of farming operations. For each year the FADN contains information of approximately 18,700 farms. Although, the total number of farms is roughly equal over the two years, this masks a great deal of turnover. The unbalanced panel contains 37,409 observations.