

From Government to Governance: The Emergence of Multi-level Governance in Central and Eastern Europe

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Plan of the lecture

- Concepts and definitions
- Changes in governance and functions of governance in the environmental context
- Multi-level governance in Central and Eastern Europe
- Case study: the rise of multi-level governance in Belarus



What is government?

- A government is the body within an organization that has the authority to make and enforce rules, laws and regulations
- The government typically refers to a civic government which can be either local, national, or international






What is governance?

Governance refers to **existing patterns that regulate social interaction** within a certain area of concern (e.g. region, an organization, a profession, a sector).

- These patterns consist of the totality of informal norms, formal regulations, laws, and actor constellations which are emerging from and reproduced by social interaction
- In the political sciences governance describes new forms of interactive steering, managing, controlling or guiding certain sectors of society that the government employ to deal with complex problems (Voss 2007)



Recent changes in the political governance




- "Hollowing out" of the state
- Predominant in western democracies
- Globalization process
- Increasing number of international organization and agreements
- Increasing number of non-state civic organizations
- Fiscal crisis of the state
- Limited steering capacity of the state
- Changing relationships between state and society (culture)
- Access to information, growing awareness (internet)



Definition of multi-level governance (multi-tiered governance/polycentric governance)

- Multi-level governance describes the dispersion of central government authority both vertically to actors located at other territorial levels, and horizontally, to non-state actors (Bache and Flinders 2004)
- Shared decision-making; interested parties not only intervene in planning but also become partially responsible for policy outcomes



Two types of multi-level governance



- Type 1 "Russian doll"
 - general-purpose
 - nonintersecting memberships
 - jurisdictions at a limited number of levels
 - system wide architecture
- Type 2 "Marble cake"
 - task-specific jurisdictions
 - intersecting memberships
 - no limit to the number of jurisdictional memberships
 - flexible design



Governance functions in the environmental context




- Exclusion of unauthorized resource users
- 2. Sharing of benefits of authorized resource use by regulating it
- 3. Provisioning the resource and sharing the costs of doing so
- 4. Monitoring of resource users
- 5. Enforcement of compliance with rules
- 6. Resolution of conflicts
- 7. Collective choice








Increasing pressure on the environment; interdependence and complexity of the relationships





- Interactions across ecological scales
- and between social and ecological scales
- Scale discordance: distributional effects across levels/scales

Emergence of novel political processes and tools in multi-level governance



Participation and governance

 Participatory approaches are institutional settings where the public and/or stakeholders of different types are brought together to participate more or less directly, and more or less formally in some stage of decision-making process

Public-private partnerships

 A government service or private business venture which is funded and operated through a partnership of government and one or more private sector companies

Market based instruments

 taxes, fees and charges; forms of subsidies and other support; tradable permits; eco-labelling; financial mechanisms (e.g. green venture capital funds); liability and compensation schemes





- Young democracies frequently changing laws, governments
- Budgetary problems
- Influence of international organizations (e.g. EU, WB), often lack of ongoing cooperation and control
- Still very hierarchical governance (Type 1 MLG), only formally open to the public – "false participation"
- Incompatible legislation: weak information dissemination, no monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms – "wild markets"
- NGOs seen as enemies not partners



The Rise of Multi-level Governance in Belarus

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Research motivation

- Comparative study of biodiversity governance in New Member States
- Information on the Internet on overexploitation of protected areas in Belarus
- An extreme case, shows why there is a need for multi-level governance and which conditions are necessary for its implementation in countries other than the western democracies



Methodology

- Case study research design, with main focus on the National Park <u>Belavezhskaya Pushcha</u> (Primeval Forest)
- Literature review
- In-depth interviews with:
- Two officials from the Belarusian Ministry of Environment
- A scientific director of the National Park
- A former scientific director of the Park, currently a NGO member (BP 21, WWF)
- Two representatives of local authorities (two different administrative districts)
- Three researchers (one from a University, one from a University and a legal NGO, and one from the Academy of Sciences)





- Four main types of protected areas in Belarus, cover about 7% of the country
- Four National Parks, which cover 1.9% of the country, created 1991 – 1999, all on state land
- Their main purpose is nature conservation and tourism

Belavezhskaya Pushcha

- covers 1,522 km² in Belarus
- the oldest nature reserve in Europe, unique primeval forest, home to bison, red deer, lynx, wild boar, white-tailed eagle, and many other protected species









Empirical findings: Biodiversity governance under the Soviet Union



- From 1939 the Belavezhskaya Pushcha was a reserve, strictly protected
- 1957 transformed into a Game Ground for top Party officials (illegal basis), utilitarian view of nature promoted also by researchers
- **Strongly transformed** to support hunting activities (drainage, fishing ponds, roads, hunting houses, overpopulation of game species, alien species)













- Transformed into a National Park as a result of pressure of researchers and Pushcha's scientific department, journalists
- Supported by the new Belarusian government
- For ten years not much changed but the name, lower budget, decrease of tourism activity, some market elements (hunting, logging), first international cooperation projects (e.g. UNESCO, GEF), small steps towards the protection improvement

Empirical findings: biodiversity governance under the new autocratic regime



- In 1994 Lukashenka elected a president, management of all national estates passed under the Presidential Management Department, also national parks
- From 2001 national parks under pressure to maximize profits, mainly through logging and tourism, since last two years yearly business plans
- **Institutional mechanisms stopped working,** personal relations more important than the law, conflicts within the administration
- Existing legal and regulatory, monitoring, and sanctioning mechanism either non existing or cannot be fully enforced (e.g. the environmental inspectorate)
- No formal channels of cooperation with local authorities, no buffer zone, most tourist activities within the Park
- Outside business activities not allowed within the Park











Empirical results: Increasing role of communities and NGOs

- Growing environmental awareness: internet, increasing education level, private property
- First environmental NGOs
- Local communities in Belarus eager to establish protected areas on their territory

However:

- Problem with compensation schemes, only formal, no enforcement mechanisms, limited property rights on land surrounded by protected areas
- No formalized interaction channels between the Park administration, local communities, and NGOs
- Often "false participation" of government friendly NGOs
- Legal prosecution of "not-constructive" NGOs
- Researchers included in the political process sometimes represent too technocratic views, in favor of "false participation"



Empirical results: Increasing role of international institutions

- Most international agreements and conventions ratified, e.g. Aarhus convention, convention on biodiversity conservation, EU funds (TACIS, INTERREG)
- To some extent reputation and exclusion sanctions on the political regime in case of non-compliance
- Some EU directives as a source of good practice (e.g. water framework directives, bird directive, habitats directive), followed by similar national regulations
- Best incentive: financial assistance; however, technical assistance projects often implemented only by western experts not aware of local circumstances, finished by reports, no ongoing impact



Conclusions

- Failure of formal institutions partially compensated by informal practices, e.g. exclusion of private land from new protected areas due to lack of compensation mechanisms
- Political process also for biodiversity protection needs plurality, researchers have often crazy ideas, which have to be balanced by other parties
- **Formal communication channels** necessary for ongoing cooperation between different stakeholders
- Market governance has to be accompanied by rules of information dissemination, monitoring and sanctioning
- Local communities and NGOs too weak on their own
- International institutions often the last hope, however, ongoing monitoring and enforcement are preconditions



Belarus and the Pushcha







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